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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a verdict and judgment of guilt after a jury trial. Prior to trial, the 
defendant had argued two pretrial Motions. First, the defendant argued that the Information should 
be dismissed because burglary as defined by I.C. § 18-140 I violates the Constitution. The District 
Comi denied the Motion. The defendant later moved the District Court in limine to prevent the state 
from allowing into evidence certain statements he had made regarding prior shoplifting events. The 
Court denied this Motion as well. The matter went to trial and a jury convicted the defendant of 
burglary. The defendant timely appealed the judgment. 
B. Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts 
Deputy Austin Toal arrested Ryan Rawlings, the defendant, on May 6, 2014 for Petit Theft 
and Burglary at a Wal-Mart in Hayden, ID. 
On August 19, 2014, the District Court heard the defendant's argument that Burglary as 
defined by I.C. § 18-1401 was unconstitutional. The defendant argued that the law i1Tationally 
imposed harsher punishment on him than those who steal without entering structures listed in the 
statute. Tr. p. 5-7. The defendant also argued that the statute essentially punished thought-crime. Tr. 
p. 8-10. 
After hearing from parties, the District Court found as to the second argument that because 
the law combined a thought with the action of entry, there could be no First Amendment violation. 
Tr. p. 14, L. 9-15, p. 15, L. 3-5, see also p. 18, L. 7-18. The District Court then took a brief recess, 
and returned to give its ruling as to the first argument. Tr. p. 16, L. 7-19. The Court found: 
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THE COURT: I certainly understand the distinctions being drawn between a person who's 
standing out in the parking lot and contemplating shoplifting expensive TVs but because he's 
10 feet outside the door, nothing can be done about it. And then there's the person that walks 
inside the building and has no thought of theft, and then decides as a brainstorm while in the 
store and decides to - and the burglary statute can't touch that person, but the person that 
actually walks across the threshold with the thought it classified as a felon, and I - I 
understand the argument. 
It's not- not without some merit, but I'm not comfortable with an equal protection analysis 
in terms of finding that the statute is unenforceable because that does not really - that 
distinction doesn't really tie to a Wal-Mart, as compared to some othr store or other building 
or tent, vessel, vehicle, railroad car, apartment, that distinction - I understand - I think I - I 
understand the argument, that the basic concept was where you were committing a trespass, 
but the statute's pretty broad in terms of not- I guess what I'm - I don't see how I could 
limit the-other than, say, the shop means Wal-Mart, I can't really see how you can restore-
I don't really see how a court can fine tune this in terms of an equal protection argument. 
As a practical matter, you know, a charge of shoplifting, it's going to be very hard to charge 
somebody who enters any building with a thought to commit theft and, in fact, no longer -
does not take any physical act that in any way completes the intent. I mean, you couldn't 
possibly prove it until there was the act of actually - actually at least picking something up. 
And, again, I don't know that that's an equal protection argument. 
We're really distinguishing not so much between people, but we're distinguishing between 
what type of building it is that they're entering. I don't know. It was very thought 
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provoking. I mean at one point one almost wonders what the constitutionality of any 
irrationality, but that's not before not before the Court. 
And I suppose as a practical matter the rationality is usually upheld by the fact that there's 
some other acts worked into it. In short, as I think is probable clear from listening to the 
Court kind of ramble, to be as positive as one could possibly be, I don't - I cannot find a 
rationale to articulate the equal protection that I - that is advance here that I'm comfortable 
with. 
Tr. p. 18, L. 19-25, p. 19, L. 1-25, p. 20, L. 1-19. Thus the Court denied the Motion. 
On September 12, 2014, the Court held a hearing on the defendant's Motion in Limine. The 
defense argued that evidence alleging that Mr. Rawlings had said he had shoplifted before at Wal-
Marts in Ohio and gotten away with it should be excluded. Tr. p. 26-27. The defense argued that the 
state's Notice of Intent to use the statements was untimely, as it had been filed an hour after the 
defense's Motion in Limine stating that no such Notice had been provided and therefore no I.R.E. 
404(b) evidence of prior bad acts should be admitted at trial. Tr. p. 26, L. 6-10, p. 27, L. 17-18, 21-
22. The defense also argued that the statements were more prejudicial than probative. Tr. p. 26, L. 
11-15. The Court ruled that the defense would be provided occasion to speak with the deputy that 
heard the statement, but that the Court intended to rule that the statements could come in as they 
were not unfairly prejudicial and went to the issues of knowledge, absence of mistake, intent, motive, 
preparation, and plan. Tr. p. 30-31. 
On September 16, 2014, the Court held a hearing in chambers on the issue of the prior bad 
acts evidence. Supp. Tr. p. 5. The Court ruled that the statements would be admitted as they were 
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evidence of intent, motive, common scheme, or plan. Supp. Tr. p. 15-16. The state then moved to 
dismiss the petit theft charge, and the Court dismissed the charge. Tr. p. 16-17. 
The Court then the same day held a trial in this matter. The state called Allen Klinkefus, a 
Wal-Mart asset protection associate. Tr. p. 36-37. Mr. Klinkefus testified that on May 6, 2014, at 
roughly 3 :00 PM he saw a person later identified as Mr. Rawlings pushing a cart containing 
merchandise, some of which was in a tote bag. Tr. p. 38. The witness further testified that he 
watched Mr. Rawlings put something in the tote bag and then go toward the front of the store. Tr. p. 
39. The defendant then went to the greeting card aisle and took a card. Tr. p. 39. Then the defendant 
went to the toy department and took a plush chair. Tr. p. 40. At that point, the defendant left the 
store without paying. Tr. p. 40. Mr. Klinkefus testified he stopped Mr. Rawlings and took him to his 
office where they had a short conversation during which Mr. Rawlings said he was taking the items 
for his daughter and was sorry. Tr. p. 41-42. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Klinkefus testified that he saw Mr. Rawlings standing in line for 
the check out for a couple of minutes. Tr. p. 43-44. 
The state's next witness was not present, so the Court took the opportunity to review the 
requested jury instructions. Tr. p. 49-54. Eventually, Austin Toal, former Deputy with the Kootenai 
County Sheriff's Department, appeared. Tr. p. 54, 56. He testified that on May 6, 2014, at some 
point in the afternoon, he went to the Wal-Mart in Hayden and contacted loss prevention. Tr. p. 57. 
Loss prevention took him to their office where he encountered Mr. Rawlings. Tr. p. 58. Mr. Toal put 
Mr. Rawlings in handcuffs and gave him the warnings generally known as Miranda warnings. Tr. p. 
59-60. He testified that Mr. Rawlings told him that Mr. Rawlings came to Wal-Mai1 to get items for 
his daughter's birthday. Tr. p. 61. Mr. Toal also testified that the shopping cart was full of items, 
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some of which did not appear related to a birthday party. Tr. p. 61. The Court then accepted the 
state's exhibits 1 through 7, photos of the items. Tr. p. 61-63. Mr. Toal then testified that Mr. 
Rawlings told him that he wanted to give his daughter a good birthday and that not paying for the 
items in the cart, in view of his bills and other issues, would make life easier. Tr. p. 64, L. 11-18. 
The prosecutor then asked Mr Toal if Mr. Rawlings had said anything else about his theft 
involvement. Tr. p. 64, L. 19-20. Mr. Toal testified that due to Mr. Rawlings having an Ohio ID he 
asked him ifhe had committed such thefts in the past. Tr. p. 64, L. 21-24. The defense objected on 
the grounds that such information would be in violation ofI.R.E. 404(b ). Tr. p. 64, L. 25, p. 65, L. 1. 
The Court overruled the objection. Tr. p. 65, L. 3. Mr. Toal testified that Mr. Rawlings admitted he 
had committed thefts in Ohio. Tr. p. 65, L. 4-5. The prosecutor then asked for specifics. Tr. p. 65, L. 
6-7. Mr. Toal testified that Mr. Rawlings told him he had gotten away with thefts before. Tr. p. 65, 
L. 8. The prosecutor asked more specifically what Mr. Rawlings said he had gotten away with. Tr. p. 
65, L. 9-10. Mr. Toal advised he needed to review his report. Tr. p. 65, L. 11-12. After he did so, 
the defense requested the jury be instructed on how to use the evidence it was being presented. Tr. p. 
65, L. 19-21. The Court instructed the jury that the evidence was not to be used to prove the 
defendant's character or that he had the disposition to commit the crime, and that it may only be used 
to prove intent. Tr. p. 66, L. 2-9. After several more questions, the prosecutor eventually got Mr. 
Toal to testify that the prior thefts Mr. Rawlings had admitted occurred at Wal-Marts. Tr. p. 66-67. 
Mr. Toal then testified that Mr. Rawlings told him his intent on coming into Wal-Mart was to give 
his daughter a good birthday. Tr. p. 67. He fm1her testified that Mr. Rawlings told him he had a 
debit card but did not know how much, if any, money was on it. Tr. p. 67. 
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On cross-examination, Mr. Toal was asked whether he told the prosecutor he was not going 
to come to court to testify, and whether he thought this case was important. Tr. p. 67-68. The Court 
sustained an objection to the second question. Tr. p. 68. 
On redirect, Mr. Toal testified he did not choose to charge Mr. Rawlings with Burglary. Tr. p. 
69. 
The state then rested. Tr. p. 69. 
The defense then moved for a directed verdict of acquittal outside the presence of the jury. 
Tr. p. 70-71. The Court denied the motion, finding that evidence that the defendant was unsure as to 
what if any funds were on his debit card, that he wanted to give his daughter a good birthday, and the 
statements as to prior shoplifting events in Ohio provided sufficient evidence for the jury to 
rationally convict the defendant of Burglary. Tr. p. 72. 
The defense then called Mr. Rawlings. Tr. p. 7 4. Mr. Rawlings testified that on May 6, 2014, 
he went shopping for his daughter. Tr. p. 75-76. He testified that at the time he went to Wal-Mart he 
was expecting a paycheck to have been placed in his account. Tr. p. 76, L. 4-8, p. 77, L. 5-6. He 
testified that after entering the store, he called the company that had his debit card and learned they 
did not have the paycheck. Tr. p. 77, L. 18-25. He testified that he then decided to call his 
grandparents for help. Tr. p. 77-78. He chose not to but determined not to go home empty handed. 
Tr. p. 78. He then went shopping. Tr. p. 78. He testified that he expected to receive roughly $300 on 
the paycheck. Tr. p. 80, L. 11-12. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Rawlings testified that he had told Mr. Toal that he did not know 
how he was going to pay his bills or buy food. Tr. p. 81. He testified he told Mr. Toal he check the 
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account for his card after entering the store. Over the defense's objection, he was allowed to testify 
that he never told Mr. Toal that he had previously shoplifted in Ohio. Tr. p. 82. 
The defense then rested. Tr. p. 83. 
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued: 
MS. MCGOVERN: [Mr. Rawling's] stated intent was he entered to provide a birthday-you 
know, a good birthday for his daughter. You know, that's something that we can all relate to, 
I think. Whether we have children or not, we can relate to that. But those children are 
motivated by those kinds of considerations, and he was motivated by that consideration at the 
time he entered Wal-Mart, knowing that's a place where he had previously gotten away with 
thefts. 
Tr. p. 89, L. 9-1 7. On rebuttal, the prosecutor argued: 
MS. MCGOVERN: Mr. Logsdon says that when it comes to showing intent, that whether or 
not he had gotten way with theft in the past doesn't make a difference. Well, that's not 
exactly what he said. He didn't just say, yeah, I stole in the past. What he said was, I have 
shoplifted previously from Wal-Mart and I always got away with it. That's what he said to 
Deputy Toal when he was talking to him. 
If that doesn't show his state of mind at the time that he's entering Wal-Mart, at the time he's 
entering Wal-Mart with the specific intent to provide his daughter a good birthday, I don't 
know what does. 
Tr. p. 98, L. 3-14. 
The jury found the defendant guilty of Burglary. Tr. p. 101. On November 5, 2014, the Court 
entered its judgment of Mr. Rawlings. 
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The defendant timely appealed from the District Court's judgment. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Whether Idaho's Burglary statue violates equal protection by irrationally punishing 
people who enter spaces surrounded by walls a ceiling more harshly than those that do 
not. 
II. Whether Idaho's Burglary statute violates the First Amendment by criminalizing 
thought. 
III. Whether a prosecutor's Notice oflntent to Use 404(b) evidence is timely if sent out 
after the pretrial conference and after the defense has already raised an objection to 
the use of any 404(b) evidence as untimely for lack of notice. 
IV. Whether the state may use an admission by the defendant that he has shoplifted in the 
past in a trial for Burglary where the state has charged that he formed the intent to 
shoplift prior to entering the store. 





The District Court erred in denying the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals found that: 
the ambit of the (burglary] statute is remarkably broad. We so noted in Matthews I. 
The statute does away with the common law requirement of a "breaking." At 
common law, burglary involved a forced breach of the security of the place entered. 
This was the "breaking" element. Thus, in common parlance, burglary came to be 
known as "breaking and entering." 
The Idaho statute omits this requirement; indeed, it does not even require a trespass. 
The statute establishes an offense based largely upon a state of mind-the intent to 
commit a crime upon entry. Thus, it gives prosecutors the power, in essence, to 
charge shoplifting as a felony if the defendant conceived of the crime before entering 
the premises. Many states do not make it a crime to enter places open to the public. It 
has been argued that persons in Idaho should not be convicted of a felony for entering 
a public place with bad thoughts. However, our Supreme Court long ago concluded 
that LC.§ 18-1401 encompasses just such situations. 
On the other hand, it may be argued that the sweeping statute is useful as a means of 
dealing effectively with a series of shoplifting incidents, such as those which 
evidently occurred in the instant case. In any event, it is the role of the Legislature to 
define crimes and to establish penalties. The Legislature apparently intended our 
burglary statute to have wide application. Absent any constitutional infirmity, which 
Matthews has not alleged, our duty is to enforce the statute as it exists. If refo1m is 
needed, the task must be left to the Legislature. Accordingly, we cannot sustain 
Matthews' challenge to the burglary statute. 
Matthews v. State, 113 Idaho 83, 86-87 (Ct.App.1987) citing State v. Bull, 4 7 Idaho 336, 276 P. 528 
(1929); Fla.Stat.§ 810.02(1) (1985); NJ.Stat.Ann.§ 2C:18-2 (1983); 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, 
Substantive Criminal Law,§ 8.13(a) (1986). While Matthews may have failed to raise the issue, it is 
plain that I.C. § 18-1401 deprives the accused of equal protection of the law and freedom of speech 
in cases such as this one. 
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B. Standard of Review 
Constitutional questions are questions of law over which courts of appeal exercise free 
review. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 151 Idaho 882, 884 (2011). 
C. The burglary statute irrationally punishes those who form the intent to steal and then enter an 
enclosed space far more harshly than those who do so without entering such a space. 
Burglary as defined by statute I.C. § 18-1401 is unconstitutional as applied to this case under 
the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I § 2 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
Equal protection of the law is guaranteed by Article 1, Section 2 of the Idaho 
Constitution and by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
The principle underlying equal protection is that all persons in like circumstances 
should receive the same benefits and burdens of the law. Accordingly, no equal 
protection analysis is required and no violation of equal protection will be found in 
situations where the State has not engaged in the disparate treatment of similarly 
situated individuals. 
State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 51 (Ct.App.2003) citing Shobe v. Ada County, Bd. ofComm'rs, 130 
Idaho 580, 585-86 (1997); Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351, 357 (1990); Bon Appetit 
Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Employment, 117 Idaho 1002, 1003 (1989); Aeschliman v. 
State, 132 Idaho 397,401 (Ct.App.1999); State v. Rountree, 129 Idaho 146, 151 (Ct.App.1996). 
In Ex Parte Mallon, 16 Idaho 737, 102 P. 374, 377 (1909), the Court analyzed a statutory 
scheme whereby punishment was increased for the wrong reasons and found it violated equal 
protection. The Com1 held: 
To say that the long-term convict commits a greater offense than the short-term 
convict is to base the punishment for such escape, not upon the act of escaping from a 
state prison, but upon the act of escaping from a punishment fixed by a court in the 
judgment of conviction. The statute in defining the offense, however, makes the 
escape from the state prison the offense, and not the escape from the punishment of 
the judgment fixed by the court upon trial. This classification is not natural, but 
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arbitrary. To justify a classification of grades of crime, there must appear some good 
and valid reason why the classification should be made as made. As said by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 
540, 22 Sup. Ct. 431, 46 L. Ed. 679 [1902]: "The difficulty is not met by saying that 
generally speaking the state when enacting laws may in its discretion make a 
classification of persons, firms, corporations, and associations in order to subserve 
public objects; for this court has held that classification 'must always rest upon some 
difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the 
classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such 
basis. * * * But arbitrary selection can never be justified by calling it classification. 
The equal protection demanded by the fourteenth amendment forbids this. *** No 
duty rests more imperatively upon the courts than the enforcement of those 
constitutional provisions intended to secure that equality of rights which is the 
foundation of free government. * * * It is apparent that the mere fact of classification 
is not sufficient to relieve a statute from the reach of the equality clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, and that in all cases it must appear, not only that a 
classification has been made, but also that it is one based upon some reasonable 
ground-some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted 
classification-and is not a mere arbitrary selection."' See, also, 
Id citing COOLEY ON CONST. LIM. pp. 556-575 (1896) available at http://archive.org/stream/ 
treatiseonconsti00coolrich/treatiseonconsti00coolrich_djvu.txt; Wagner v. Milwaukee Co., 112 Wis. 
601, 88 N. W. 577 (1902); Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn. 264, 33 N. W. 800; Sutton v. State, 96 Tenn. 
696, 36 S. W. 697, 33 L. R. A. 589 (1896); Murray v. Board of Com., 81 Minn. 359, 84 N. W. 103, 
51 L. R. A. 828, 83 Am. St. Rep. 379 (1900). 
In State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50 (1952), the Court made a similar ruling on the grounds that the 
statute violated the ban on cruel and unusual punishment stated in Art. I § 6 of the Idaho 
Constitution. In Evans the Court held: 
With considerable justification it is urged that conduct of a comparatively innocent 
nature, such as 'necking' or 'petting', where a child under 16 is involved, may, in the 
eyes of some enforcement officers, constitute a violation of this statute. Be that as it 
may, it is obvious that acts of a more or less trivial nature are within its broad terms. 
Life imprisonment for such offenses would be cruel and unusual punishment. Even 
our rape statute does not require such punishment. 
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We are, therefore, faced with the alternative of declaring the act unconstitutional or 
so construing it as to comport with that instrument. It is the duty of the courts to 
uphold the constitutionality of legislative enactments when that can be done by 
reasonable construction. 
To construe § 18-6607 as requiring or permitting the district judge in imposing 
sentence to fix the maximum, and that it may be less than life, is a reasonable 
construction. The presumption is that the legislature intended to act within the limits 
of the constitution. Therefore, in order to give effect to the act we hold that it is to be 
construed as permitting the district judge to fix a maximum imprisonment at less than 
life. 
Id. at 59 citing Storseth v. State, 72 Idaho 49 (1951 ); State v. Casselman, 69 Idaho 23 7(1949); State 
ex rel. Wright v. Headrick, 65 Idaho 148 (1943); Scandrett v. Shoshone County, 63 Idaho 46 (1941 ). 
While the Court in Evans reviewed the statute and its penalty from a cruel and unusual framework, 
its analysis is clearly similar to its analysis on equal protection grounds in Mallon. Essentially, the 
Court found that classifying necking and petting in the same way as genital manipulation would be 
unconstitutional, because the gravity of the actions differed so greatly. 
In Idaho burglary is defined as: 
Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, 
store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, or other building, tent, vessel, vehicle, trailer, 
airplane or railroad car, with intent to commit any theft or any felony, is guilty of 
burglary. 
LC.§ 18-1401. LC.§ 18-1401 separates those like the defendant intending a theft at the moment 
they enter an enclosed structure, even though no trespass occurs, from those who intend a theft one 
moment after trespassing within, or who intend prior to entry, decide against the theft, but after 
entering, change their mind again. This definition seems to describe an attempted theft. 
Attempt consists of"( 1) an intent to do an act ... which would in law amount to a 
crime; and (2) an act in furtherance of that intent which, as it is most commonly put, 
goes beyond mere preparation." 
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LC.§ 18-306. State v. Fabeny, 132 Idaho 917,923 (Ct.App.1999) citing W. LaFave & A. Scott, 
Substantive Criminal Law § 6.2 (1986); see also State v. Otto, 102 Idaho 250, 251 (1981 ); State v. 
Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 492 (Ct.App.1984). However, as will be discussed in Part II, mere entry 
could not be considered an attempt at theft. Thus, as in Mallon and Evans, no explanation can be 
given for why the defendant deserves to be made a felon under LC. § 18-1403 when he not even 
completed a successful attempted theft under LC. § 18-306. 
The only other state with a similar definition of burglary is Nevada. N.R.S. 205.060. The 
state of California, which has defined burglary as entry into various spaces with the intent to commit 
theft or a felony since 1875, reduced such cases involving shoplifting to a misdemeanor in 2014. 
Ann.Cal.Penal Code§§ 459,459.5; Code Am.1875-76, c. 56, p. 111, § 1. Ten states, the states of 
Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, N01ih Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, 
Virgiania, and Massachusetts require breaking and entering (some also require that it take place at 
night). IC 35-43-2-1; MD Code, Criminal Law,§ 6-203, 204,202; M.G.L.A. 266 § 15; Miss. Code 
Ann.§ 97-17-23; Neb.Rev.St.§ 28-507; N.M.S.A. 1978, § 20-12-61; N.C.G.S.A. § 14-51; 21 
Oki.St.Ann.§ 1435; Gen.Laws 1956 § 11-8-1; VA Code Ann.§ 18.2-89. The state of Maryland 
outlaws being in or on a dwelling, storehouse, yard, garden or other area belonging to a dwelling or 
storehouse with the intent to commit theft, but the act is punished as a misdemeanor. MD Code, 
Criminal Law, § 6-205. All thirty-seven remaining states require that the entry or remaining within 
that space be done unlawfully, i.e., without invitation or privilege to be therein. See Ala.Code 1975 
§ 13A-7-7; AS§ 11.46.300; A.R.S. § 13-1506; A.C.A. § 5-39-101; AC.A.§ 5-39-201; C.R.S.A. § 
18-4-203; C.G.S.A. § 53a-103; 11 De.C. § 824; F.S.A. § 810.02; Ga. Code Ann.§ 16-7-1; HRS§ 
708-811; 720 ILCS 5/19-1; LC.A. § 713.1; K.S.A. 21-5807; KRS § 511.040; LSA-R.S. 14:62; 17-A 
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M.R.S.A. § 401; MI ST 750.112; M.S.A. § 609.582; V.A.M.S. 569.170; MCA 45-6-204; NDCC 
12.1-22-02; N.H. Rev. Stat.§ 635: l; N.J.S.A. 2C: 18-2; NY Penal§ 140.00; R.C. § 2911.12; O.R.S. 
§ 164.215; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502; Code 1976 § 16-11-313; SDCL § 22-32-8; T.C.A. § 39-14-402; 
V.T.C.A. Penal Code § 30.02; U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-202; 13 V.S.A. § 1201; RCWA 9A.52.020; 
W.Va. Code§ 61-3-11; W.S.A. 943.10; W.S.1977 § 6-3-301. 
Idaho and Nevada's statutes are therefore an anomaly. The unpopularity of their definition of 
burglary no doubt comes from the common law understanding of what burglary is and why it 
deserves felony status. As the Supreme Court found in Taylor v. US, 495 U.S. 575, 588 (1990): 
The legislative history also indicates that Congress singled out burglary (as opposed 
to other frequently committed property crimes such as larceny and auto theft) for 
inclusion as a predicate offense, both in 1984 and in 1986, because of its inherent 
potential for harm to persons. The fact that an offender enters a building to 
commit a crime often creates the possibility of a violent confrontation between 
the offender and an occupant, caretaker, or some other person who comes to 
investigate. And the offender's own awareness of this possibility may mean that 
he is prepared to use violence if necessary to carry out his plans or to escape. 
Congress apparently thought that all burglaries serious enough to be punishable by 
imprisonment for more than a year constituted a category of crimes that shared this 
potential for violence and that were likely to be committed by career criminals. There 
never was any proposal to limit the predicate offense to some special subclass of 
burglaries that might be especially dangerous, such as those where the offender is 
armed, or the building is occupied, or the crime occurs at night. [ emphasis added.] 
The Court then went on to define for federal law what burglary meant, so as not to have states' 
various definitions change what is, "generic burglary": 
Although the exact formulations vary, the generic, contemporary meaning of burglary 
contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or 
remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime. [footnote 
omitted] 
Id. at 598 citing LaFave & Scott, supra at 9, § 8.13(a), p. 466 (modern statutes "generally 
require that the entry be unprivileged"); id,§ 8.13(c), p. 471 (modern statutes "typically 
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describe the place as a 'building' or 'structure'"); id.,§ 8.13(e), p. 474 ("[T]he prevailing 
view in the modern codes is that an intent to commit any offense will do").. Without that 
predicate that creates danger, that willingness to place others and oneself in such a position, 
there can be no felony burglary. 
The Tenth Circuit was posed with the issue of how to classify a burglary in 
California. The Court referenced as example a case like the one in this matter: 
An example helps illuminate the problem. Take the defendant in Sherow. The state 
charged him with "burglarizing" a pawn shop by entering with the intent to sell stolen 
DVDs. Now, surely fencing ill-gotten goods is a crime most everywhere. But just as 
surely it seems an odd thing to call the activity a "burglary." We usually 
("generically") think of burglary as involving an entirely unlawful or unprivileged 
entry, not walking into a pawn shop to sell goods during working hours. But 
California is different. It defines burglary to encompass any entry (lawful or 
unlawful) with the intent to commit a felony. So in California the state could charge 
Mr. Sherow with burglarizing even a shop he entered to sell (stolen) goods to a 
willing buyer. And this oddity is only followed by another. Mr. Sherow could avoid a 
conviction by showing "informed consent"-by showing the pawn shop manager 
invited him to enter the shop knowing of his felonious intent to sell stolen 
merchandise. On such a showing, Mr. Sherow's activity all of a sudden no longer 
qualifies as a burglary even in California, whatever else it might be called and 
however else it might be punished. 128 Cal.Rptr.3d at 259-64. 
Now to our curious situation add this assumption: the state's burglary indictment says 
Mr. Sherow "unlawfully" entered the pawn shop. By adding the word "unlawfully," 
it's possible the state prosecutors meant to charge Mr. Sherow with entering the pawn 
shop without any consent from the manager. But there was no reason for the 
prosecutors to do so in order to win a conviction. Maybe they foresaw the possibility 
Mr. Sherow would commit a federal crime some time in the future and meant to lay 
the foundation for a sentencing enhancement or ACCA charge. A very prescient and 
helpful move for the benefit of future federal prosecutors surely, but otherwise 
pointless for state prosecutors seeking to prove a state crime. Alternatively, it is 
possible the state prosecutors added the word in order to indicate Mr. Sherow entered 
without the manager's iriformed consent. In the unconventional world California has 
constructed, the word "unlawfully" in this scenario does real work under state law, 
aiming directly at an affirmative defense and claiming Mr. Sherow can't prove it. 
US. v. Huizar, 688 F.3d 1193, 1195-96 (10th Cir.2012) (emphasis in original) citing People v. 
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Sharow, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 255 (2011). Of course, Idaho has no such defense to burglary, so it is, if 
anything, the most "unconventional" of states. 
In this case, the defendant is in a category of those who intend to commit theft and then 
singled out for a longer and more arduous process as well as far harsher punishment because that 
intent existed while entering a structure. He was not trespassing, rather, he was part of the normal 
shopping public entering a store he had been invited to enter. The difference in treatment cannot be 
rationally answered if one looks at the acceptable factors for sentencing. See State v. Toohill, I 03 
Idaho 565 (Ct.App.1982). 
First, deterrence is an oft cited and less than effective goal of criminal punishment. Due to 
the roll the dice nature of punishment rarely do studies of criminal punishment determine that 
deterrence is a primary result of sentences. See Valerie Wright, Deterrence in Criminal Justice: 
Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (November 2010), 
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/Deterrence%20Briefing%20.pdf; Jacqueline 
Mmiin, The English Legal System p. 176. (Hodder Arnold 4th ed. 2005). Rather, the studies reveal 
that harsher punishment has little deterrent effect. See id. It is the certainty of punishment that 
matters. See id. 
Thus, unsurprisingly, making it a felony if a person has the bad luck to not only get caught 
shoplifting but also make various statements as to their intention entering the store, is hardly a 
deterrent from shoplifting in Idaho, a matter made worse where the defendant is from one of any 
forty-eight other states with different laws. 
Next, while a worthy goal, the general mood of the country has been away from essentially 
placing citizens within the bosom of the state for long periods of time in the hopes that somehow the 
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state will fix them. Etienne Benson, Rehabilitate or Punish?, American Psychological Association 
(2003), available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/julaug03/rehab.aspx. In any case, it hardly makes 
sense that someone who committed a premeditated theft is in need of more than two years worth of 
rehabilitation. If the case were otherwise, then presumably all theft would be a felony in Idaho and 
elsewhere in the country. 
Revenge is a powerful motivator and has an ancient pedigree at common law. See Francis 
Brown Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REv. 974, 977 (1932) (law sought in the Middle Ages in 
England to supplant the violent tradition of blood feud). At law, however, courts and lawmakers 
must be mindful of spiraling so wildly out of control over the bloodlust of the masses that our laws 
breed distrust, disbelief, and dissension. As the Supreme Court has held, "for retribution as a 
justification ... this very much depends on the degree of [the defendant's] culpability." Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982). 
In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962), a statute making narcotics 
addiction a crime, even though such addiction "is apparently an illness which may be 
contracted innocently or involuntarily," was struck down under the Eighth 
Amendment. Similarly, in Weems v. United States, the Court invalidated a statute 
making it a crime for a public official to make a false entry in a public record but not 
requiring the offender to "injur[ e] any one by his act or inten[ d] to injure any one." 
217 U.S. 349, 363 (1910). The Court employed a similar approach in Godfrey v. 
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,433 (1980), reversing a death sentence based on the existence 
of an aggravating circumstance because the defendant's crime did not reflect "a 
consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder." 
Id. In Godfi·ey, the Supreme Court had reviewed and struck down a statute permitting the death 
penalty where the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhumane." 217 U.S. at 
433. The Court then restated its holding in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977): 
it "is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to 
impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice 
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or emotion." 
Id. There is no reason to think that caprice and emotion are good reasons to make felons out of 
shoplifters. 
Regardless of the vengeful attitudes of Wal-Mart and other large retail stores, culpability 
remains as ever tied to the actions and choices of the defendant. The defendant in this case is hardly 
more culpable than others who commit theft, particularly those who commit premeditated thefts but 
do not enter buildings, tents, and other spaces included in the statute. There is nothing additionally 
immoral about planning to go steal as compared to doing so on a whim. Thus, the spirit of revenge 
must necessarily fail as the foundation for the possible penalty in this matter, as the law respects 
retribution only so far as culpability exists. 
held: 
Finally, protection of society is the highest interest of all law. The Idaho Supreme Court 
Important as are the humanitarian considerations affecting the accused, his family 
and other relatives, and the importance to society of rehabiliation [sic] itself, such 
considerations cannot be allowed to control or defeat punishment, where other factors 
are ignored or subordinated to the detriment of society. 
State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 363 (1956). Thus, determining what is right for society requires the 
balancing of the other interests of sentencing and a judgment on what is good for society. As has 
been shown, I.C. § 18-1401 does little to deter shoplifting. It does not provide a convincing 
argument for a longer period than two years for purposes ofrehabilitation. It fails to ascribe itself to 
retribution, as it is unrelated to culpability. Simply put, branding a defendant a felon for the conduct 
in this case does not protect society any more than a misdemeanor. It may in fact exacerbate the 
issue, as felony status carries with it a number of collateral consequences that make housing, 
- 18 -
employment and receiving government aid more difficult or impossible. Considering the causes of 
theft can often be related to poverty, a policy of making it even more difficult to get out of the 
circumstances causing the conduct is very likely self-defeating. 
Thus, the line Idaho's law draws between a felonious theft and a simple shoplifting incident 
is entirely arbitrary and cannot stand. The District Court in this matter recognized that the situation 
was irrational at least as it applied to Wal-Mart. Tr. p. 18, L. 19-25, p. 19, L. 1-25, p. 20, L. 1-19. 
The Court's concern that it could not tailor a ruling that would single out Wal-Mart shoplifting as 
unconstitutional seeks an unnecessary finding that Wal-Maii is some kind of attractive nuisance 
because it makes shoplifting so easy. This Court need only concern itself with whether the statute as 
applied to Mr. Rawlings has any sense as compared to similarly situated shoplifters. It does not. 
This Comi should strike it down. 
D. The burglary statute criminalizes thought by pairing it with an action of no importance in 
violation of the First Amendment. 
The First Amendment to the United State Constitution prevents a state from passing a law 
that outlaws speech based on content, except for a few exceptions. See Git/ow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652 (1925). "Regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content 
of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment." Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 
648-649 (1984). See also Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). The First 
Amendment presumptively places this s01i of discrimination beyond the power of the government. 
As the Supreme Court of the United States reiterated in Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49 
(1991) quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971): " 'The constitutional right of free 
expression is ... intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, 
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putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us ... in the 
belief that no other approach would comport with the premise ofindividual dignity and choice upon 
which our political system rests.'" There are exceptions to this right, and the only which could apply 
to this conduct is true threats. 
"True threats" encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a 
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or 
group of individuals. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) ("political hyberbole" is 
not a true threat); R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). The speaker need not actually 
intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats "protect[ s] individuals from the 
fear of violence" and "from the disruption that fear engenders," in addition to protecting people 
"from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur." Id. 
Here, the Legislature has chosen to outlaw thoughts of theft at the moment one enters a space 
with walls and a ceiling. It has long been the stance of this nation that an actus reus is required for a 
crime, and that "thought crime" is impossible in a civilized society and under the First Amendment. 
US. v. Ba/sys, 524 U.S. 666, 714 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 
660 (1962). Mere intentions alone cannot make a crime. See A1orissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
246, 250 (1952) ("The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by 
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of 
law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual 
to choose between good and evil"). To prohibit thought crime has been recognized to be "anathema 
to the First Amendment." Jackson v. Thurmer, 748 F.Supp.2d 990, 995 (W.D.Wis.2010); see also 
US. v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 182-83 (2nd Cir.2011) (Raggi, J., concurring in pa1i); US. v. 
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Kaechele, 466 F.Supp.2d 868 (E.D.Mich.2006); but see People v. Keister, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 566 
(Cal.App.2011) (thought crime argued as violating Equal Protection Clause). 
One might think that I. C. § 18-1401 was simply a different way to charge an attempted theft 
or felony under LC.§ 18-306, however, the preparatory phase of a crime consists of"devising or 
arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission of the offense." Otto, l 02 Idaho at 
25 l quoting Perkins, Criminal Law 557 (2d ed.1969). To go beyond mere preparation, the actions of 
the defendant must "reach far enough toward the accomplishment of the desired result to amount to 
the commencement of the consummation of the crime." Id. Of importance in this analysis is "the 
proximity of the act, both spatially and temporally, to the completion of the criminal design." Id. at 
252 n. 2. It has been said that for a criminal attempt to occur, there "must be a dangerous proximity 
to success." Id quoting Perkins, Criminal Law 572 (2d ed. 1969). 
Thus, in State v. Pittman, Not Reported in A.3d, 2011 WL 320944, at * 11 
(N.J.Super.A.D.,2011), the Court found that a substantial step toward theft was committed when: 
defendant and his co-conspirators crafted a plan to forcefully steal from a taxi-driver 
at gunpoint, and in furtherance thereof called a cab company, entered the cab with the 
intent to steal and armed with a gun, and commenced executing their plan, which was 
aborted when the cab driver was shot in the neck from behind. 
In State v. Walker, Not Reported in A.2d, 2009 WL 815650, at *3 (N.J.Super.A.D.,2009), the Court 
found the "defendant's entry of the vehicle, moving both the steering wheel and his feet in the foot 
well area" were a substantial step toward car theft. And so, it comes as little surprise that in Bryan v. 
State, not published in 716 A.2d 974 at * 1 (Del.1998) the Delaware Supreme Court held: 
3) The trial judge found Bryan delinquent of burglary third degree, but acquitted him 
of the attempted theft charge. Bryan argues that, ifhe did not commit attempted theft, 
then he could not have committed burglary, since the attempted theft was the 
predicate crime in the burglary charge. 
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4) Bryan's argument lacks merit. Different verdicts must be rejected as being legally 
inconsistent only if the elements of the separate charges are identical. The crimes of 
burglary and attempted theft have different elements. To be found delinquent on the 
charge of burglary in the third degree, the State had to prove that Bryan "knowingly 
enter[ ed] or remain[ ed] unlawfully in the building with intent to commit a crime 
therein .... " On the charge of attempted theft, the State had to prove that Bryan 
intentionally took a "substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in 
the commission of the crime" of theft. 
5) In this case, the Family Court was convinced that Bryan unlawfully entered his 
aunt's house with the intent to commit the crime of theft. The State failed to establish 
that, after Bryan's unlawful entry, Bryan took a "substantial step" in a plan to steal his 
aunt's property. Thus, there was no legal inconsistency in the Family Court's two 
verdicts. 
citing Alston v. State, Del.Supr., 410 A.2d 1019, 1020 (Del.1980); 11 Del.C. § 824; 11 Del. C. § 
531. See also State v. Hall, 94 Or.App. 24 (Or.App., 1988). The fact is, mere entry is a not a 
substantial step toward anything. 
Thus, the question presented here is, can the government bootstrap an intention to an 
innocent action and create a crime? The District Court found that this is indeed the case. Tr. p. 14, 
L. 9-15, p. 15, L. 3-5, see also p. 18, L. 7-18. Other courts when confronted with the issue have not 
been so sanguine about allowing the government to make it a crime wherever the governn1ent pairs a 
thought with an action. In point of fact, there is nothing novel about the issue, as the Second Circuit 
noted in US. v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401,408 (2nd Cir. 2003): 
The problem faced by the drafters [ of the Model Penal Code] was that to punish as an 
attempt every act done to further a criminal purpose, no matter how remote from 
accomplishing harm, risks punishing individuals for their thoughts alone, before they 
have committed any act that is dangerous or harmful. 
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In cases where attempt is alleged, it is for precisely these concerns that the accused are exonerated. 
See Enoch v. State, So.3d 344, 362 (Fl.App.2012) citing State v. Gaines, 431 So.2d 736, 737 
(Fl.App.1983) ("thinking about an illegal act is not, by itself, a crime"). 
The Third Circuit in US. v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458 (3rd. Cir.2006) considered the same 
argument the defendant in this matter is advancing in the context of a better written statute: 
Tykarsky next argues that he cannot constitutionally be charged under 18 U.S.C. § 
2423(b) for doing nothing more than traveling to another state with the intent 
prohibited by that section. He contends that the statute lacks a "meaningful actus 
reus" and punishes the mere act of thinking while traveling, in violation of his rights 
under the First, Fifth and Eighth Amendments. We reject this contention. 
As other courts of appeals have observed, it is clear that [18 U.S.C. § 2423(b )] does 
not punish thought alone. At least one act must occur for an individual to be 
convicted under§ 2423(b): crossing a state line. See [US. v. Bredimus, 352 F.2d 200, 
208 (5th. Cir.2003)] ("Consistent with our fellow circuits, therefore, we find that 
Section 2423(b) does not prohibit mere thought or mere preparation because it 
requires as an element that the offender actually travel in foreign commerce."); US. 
v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1998). That§ 2423(b) contains an actus reus 
component, however, does not alone make it constitutional. The government cannot 
punish what it considers to be an immoral thought simply by linking it to otherwise 
innocuous acts, such as walking down the street or chewing gum. If§ 2423(b) 
proscribed interstate travel with the mere abstract intent to engage in sexual activity 
with a minor at some undetermined point in the future, this would be a more difficult 
case. 
But it does not. Contrary to Tykarsky's characterization, the relationship between the 
mens rea and the actus reus required by § 2423 (b) is neither incidental nor tangential. 
Section 2423(b) does not simply prohibit traveling with an immoral thought, or even 
with an amorphous intent to engage in sexual activity with a minor in another state. 
The travel must be for the purpose of engaging in the unlawful sexual act. See US. v. 
Hayward, 359 F.3d 631,638 (3d Cir.2004) (holding that the government must show 
that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely 
incidental one). By requiring that the interstate travel be "for the purpose of' 
engaging in illicit sexual activity, Congress has narrowed the scope of the law to 
exclude mere preparation, thought or fantasy; the statute only applies when the travel 
is a necessary step in the commission of a crime. 
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(italics in original). Note that LC. § 18-1401 does not contain a "for the purpose of' provision 
saving it from constitutional impropriety. 
Moreover, laws such as Idaho's burglary statute also chill speech and thought. See R.A. V, 
505 U.S. at 402. Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 
494 (1951 ), that would later form the basis of the current test for criminal advocacy in Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-8 (1969). The Justice found: 
It is true that there is no divining rod by which we may locate 'advocacy.' Exposition 
of ideas readily merges into advocacy. The same Justice who gave currency to 
application of the incitement doctrine in this field dissented four times from what he 
thought was its misapplication. As he said in the Git/ow dissent, 'Every idea is an 
incitement.' Even though advocacy of overthrow deserves little protection, we should 
hesitate to prohibit it if we thereby inhibit the interchange of rational ideas so 
essential to representative government and free society. 
341 U.S. at 545-46 quoting Gitlow 268 U.S. at 637 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Thus, it is difficult to 
see how a law which makes mere intention to commit a crime while entering a four-walled structure 
will lead to ten year imprisonment does not interfere with protected speech. The marketplace of 
ideas is hardly open to all if the state may argue that individuals who have expressed certain ideas 
hold certain intentions and that those intentions are "triggered" by everyday actions, such as going to 
the store. 
There was a popular book in the 1970s in this country called Steal this Book. Abbie 
Hoffman had it published in 1971. No one ever attempted to prevent its publication. Had Mr. 
Hoffman known that he could likely find himself arrested for burglary every time he entered a 
building, he likely never would have written it. It is not for the state ofldaho' s Legislature to decide 
what thoughts are criminal. By making innocent conduct coupled with unpopular thoughts a felony, 
Idaho has gone far beyond the constraints of the First Amendment and chilled constitutionally 
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protected conduct. This law must not be allowed to stand. This Court must strike it down. 
II. 
A. Introduction 
The District Court erred in not excluding the defendant's alleged statements about shoplifting 
from Wal-Mart in the past. The Court allowed the state's late disclosure on the basis that that the 
deputy could simply testify ahead of time about the statement having been made, thereby failing to 
take into account the affect on trial strategy that occurs where the state fails to disclose timely. The 
Court also followed the ruling in State v. Brummett. The Court of Appeals ruling in Brummett, 
however, is manifestly wrong in finding that such facts are more probative than prejudicial, and 
should be overruled. 
B. Standard of Review 
An appellate court defers to a trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial and 
competent evidence in the record. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). Whether evidence is 
relevant is an issue oflaw. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,667 (2010); State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 
210, 214 (2009). Therefore, when considering admission of evidence of prior bad acts, appellate 
courts exercise free review of the trial court's relevancy determination. Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214. 
The second tier in the analysis is the determination of whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. When reviewing 
this tier appellate courts use an abuse of discretion standard. Id 
C. The state's notice of 404(b) evidence was untimely. 
To exclude any evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant to Idaho Rule ofEvidence 
404(b) which states: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
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character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident, provided that the prosecution in a criminal case shall 
file and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or during trial if the 
court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature 
of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. (Emphasis added.) 
In State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225,230 (2008), the Court held "that compliance with I.RE. 
404(b) is mandatory and a condition precedent to admission of other acts evidence." Good cause for 
lack ofreasonable notice includes the state's only just having discovered the evidence. See State v. 
Naranjo, 152 Idaho 134, 139(Ct.App.2011 ). In such a case, however, the Court should provide the 
defendant with time to prepare. See State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 284 (1982). Where good cause 
does not exist, the evidence must be excluded for lack of reasonable notice. Naranjo, 152 Idaho at 
141-142. 
In Naranjo, the State provided the defendant with notice that it planned to use 404(b) 
evidence the day before trial. Id. at 139. The defendant argued that it would be impossible to defend 
against the evidence as there was no time to prepare a defense, and pointed out that the state had long 
known about the evidence. Id. The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the trial court which had 
originally also held the evidence inadmissible but had later allowed it. Id. at 140-42. 
In this case, the prosecution provided the defendant with boilerplate language stating that 
404(b) evidence will be used on May 12, 2014. Rule 404(b) requires that the state provide the 
defendant with notice of "the general nature" of such evidence. Clearly this requirement goes 
beyond a bare bones declaration that 404(b) evidence will be used as such notice would be oflittle or 
no use to the preparation of a defense. On August 19, 2014, the Court heard the defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss. On September 5, 2014, the Court held a pretrial conference where no mention was made 
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of 404(b) evidence. On September 5, 2014, the defense filed a Motion in Limine asking that 404(b) 
evidence be excluded for lack of notice. An hour and five minutes later the state filed a Notice of 
Intent to Use 404(b) evidence. 
On September 11, 2014, the Court heard argument that the state's Notice was untimely. The 
Court did not find that it was untimely, but did require the state to make its officer available to the 
defense on September 16, 2014, the day of trial, prior to 8:30 AM. 
Therefore, by the Court's actions, it appears to have accepted that the Notice was late, but 
that the prejudice from the late disclosure could be cured by having the deputy available early the day 
of trial. This is not the test. As the Court of Appeals held in Naranjo: 
In State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225,230 (2008), the Court addressed the consequences 
of a prosecutor's failure to properly provide I.R.E. 404(b) notice. Sheldon was 
charged with trafficking in methamphetamine and concealing a dangerous weapon. 
The prosecution failed to serve any I.R.E. 404(b) notice or request the district court to 
excuse notice during trial. At trial, an officer testified that during interrogation "Mr. 
Sheldon told me that he was involved in dealing methamphetamine in the past and 
told me that he dealt smaller quantities than what was found in his vehicle." Id. at 
229. The Court held "that compliance with I.R.E. 404(b) is mandatory and a 
condition precedent to admission of other acts evidence." Id. at 230. The Court held 
that because the State had failed to comply with the notice provision in the rule, the 
statements were inadmissible. Id. The Sheldon court then turned to the question 
of harmless error and held that the focus was not on prejudice from the lack of 
notice, but rather from the content of the inadmissible evidence. Id. In Baldwin v. 
State, 145 Idaho 148, 157 (2008), the Court stated that "to hold an error harmless, 
this Court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no 
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction." 
[ emphasis added] 
152 Idaho at 140. Thus, Court in Naranjo found that an untimely Notice is in essence, no notice, and 
cannot be cured without a showing of good cause. 
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D. The defendant's alleged statements to the deputy that he had gotten away with shoplifting at 
Wal-Mart in the past should have been excluded. 
In determining the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
utilized a two-tiered analysis. The first tier involves a two-part inquiry: (1) whether there is sufficient 
evidence to establish the prior bad acts as fact; and (2) whether the prior bad acts are relevant to a 
material disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. 
Such evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude the act occurred and the defendant 
was the actor. Id. 
The second tier in the analysis is the determination of whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Grist, 14 7 Idaho at 52. When a trial court's 
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to 
determine: ( 1) whether the lower court con-ectly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether 
the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its 
decision by an exercise ofreason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600 (1989). 
When there is controlling precedent on questions of Idaho law "the rule of stare decisis 
dictates that we follow it, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or 
unwise, or unless oven-uling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles oflaw and remedy 
continued injustice." Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77 (1990). While it is 
important that parties and their counsel have predictability regarding the law so that they may make 
informed decisions in the conduct of their affairs, when the judicial interpretation of a rule is 
manifestly wrong, stare decisis does not require that courts continue an incorrect reading of the rule. 
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"We have stated frequently that we will not follow prior incorrect decisions merely because the cases 
exist. The rule to stand by decided cases and to maintain former adjudications contemplates more 
than blindly following a former decision even if it is manifestly wrong." Sherwood v. Carter, 119 
Idaho 246,256 (1991). 
In this matter, the state used the defendant's statement that he had gotten away with 
shoplifting at Wal-Marts before in Ohio to prove his intent to steal on entry into Wal-Mart. The 
District Court should have held that this was more prejudicial than probative. The Court did not, 
however, out of deference to the Court of Appeals' ruling in State v. Brummett, 150 Idaho 339 
(Ct.App.2010). 
The Court in Brummett held: 
Next, we consider Brummett's argument that the evidence was, nonetheless, 
inadmissible because it could not show his intent without making the implied 
conclusion that, because he stole before, he was guilty of the crime in this case. 
However, the logical inference to be drawn by the intent evidence is not that, because 
Brummett committed the act before, he committed it in this case. Rather, the 
inference is that, because Brummett has committed the act with the requisite criminal 
intent on previous occasions, it is less likely that he entered the store with innocent 
intent on the present occasion. According to one prominent treatise: 
The theory upon which evidence of other crimes is admissible on (the intent issue] 
under Rule 404(b) is that its use on the mental element of the offense does not require 
an inference as to the character of the accused or as to his conduct. For instance, 
when an accused charged with attempted burglary claims that he had mistaken the 
home of another for his own, evidence that he tried to force his way into two other 
houses while making lascivious remarks to the occupants tends to show a somewhat 
different state of mind. As [2 Wigmore, Evidence, 3d ed. 1940 § 300] explains, the 
evidence of intent can be offered on the theory of probabilities. We can accept the 
defense that an accused car thief had a good faith belief that he had permission to 
take an automobile on one occasion but when the evidence shows that he has made 
similar "mistakes" before, our doubts grow. It is the improbability of these fortuities 
rather than any inference as to the character of the accused that supports the belief 
in guilt. 
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22 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 
5242 (1978) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, because Brummett 
admitted to the act of theft and because burglary is a specific intent crime and 
Brummett's intent was squarely at issue, the evidence of his prior thefts from other 
area Shopko stores was relevant. 
Brummett next contends that the district court ened by finding that the probative 
value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. A lower court's determination under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 
406 (1991 ); State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1059 (Ct.App.1989). Brummett claims 
that the evidence relied on the disfavored implication of his criminal propensity. 
Thus, he argues, it had little probative value compared with the prejudicial effect of 
portraying him as a common thief to the jury. We have concluded that using prior 
bad acts evidence to show Brummett's intent, when intent was squarely at issue, 
does not rely on the implication of his criminal propensity. Rather, in this case, 
the sole material issue in dispute regarding the burglary charge was whether 
Brummett intended to steal the merchandise at the time he entered the store. The 
admissible evidence of his various thefts and attempted thefts from other area Shopko 
stores was highly probative of his criminal intent on the day in question. 
Furthermore, in light of Brummett's admission that he attempted to illegally take the 
items from the store, we find little risk that the evidence of his prior misconduct 
would be unduly prejudicial. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the district court 
abused its discretion by finding that the probative value of the evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. [footnotes omitted] 
[ emphasis added] 
Id. at 343-44. 
The Court's holding then was that because logic dictates that prior thefts go to intent and not 
propensity, there is no issue under I.R.E. 404(b). The Court thus framed the issue too broadly by 
looking at burglaries as they are understood by the rest of the world, and also incorrectly determined 
that because evidence fits an exception somehow it ceases to have any tendency to show evidence of 
character. 
The Court inconectly surmises from the exception analysis under I.R.E. 404(b) that because 
the inference from the evidence probative as to intent in this scenario is not relevant to propensity to 
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commit theft or bad character means that the evidence has no unduly prejudicial effect by exposing 
the jury to bad act evidence. Brummett, 150 Idaho at 344. The Court of Appeals additionally found 
that the fact that the defendant agreed he had attempted or committed theft further reduces any unfair 
prejudice. 150 Idaho at 344. 
However, the only question before the jury is when the defendant chose to steal. The Court 
of Appeals fails to recognize that burglary from a public space or a private business open to the 
public is completely different from the examples given by Wigmore. See Brummett, 150 Idaho at 
343. Wigmore's examples all involve trespass. The question in this case and in Brummett is 
whether the defendant went to the store to be a thief or upon arriving decided to be a thief. That 
question does not present itself for the would-be rapist or car thief. The rapist will not argue he 
entered the home for warmth but once inside decided to commit rape. Nor with the car thief say he 
entered the car just to sit in a car seat. Both arguments would be absurd and unhelpful to the 
defendant. There is nothing about a person having committed a theft in the past that informs whether 
they might choose to steal again in the future before or after setting foot over a threshold. The only 
thing a prior theft informs is the capacity to steal, but not when one forms the intent. Under Idaho's 
burglary statute, one cannot draw the same conclusions as Wigmore because the "probabilities" 
created by a prior theft are the probability that one would steal again, not when they choose to do so. 
The Court's contention that because the defendant admitted to having been a theft on this one 
occasion there can be no further prejudice from finding out he has stolen in the past is incorrect. 
Moreover, even those who have committed thefts in the near past continue to be members of 
the shopping public. For the jury then, the inference from prior thefts is that the defendant goes 
about purposefully to thieve. That in fact is what the Court of Appeals essentially held. Brummett, 
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150 Idaho at 343 ("the inference is that, because Brummett has committed the act with the requisite 
criminal intent on previous occasions, it is less likely that he entered the store with innocent intent on 
the present occasion"). But courts cannot allow convictions simply because a person has committed 
thefts in the past. This is propensity evidence. I.R.E. 404(b) evidence is always propensity evidence, 
and it will always show propensity while being used to show one of the categories for which such 
evidence is admissible. See 22 Wright & Graham, Jr., supra at 32, at§ 5239. When the defendant 
argues that he shot his wife on accident and the state seeks to show he has shot her before, the state 
wishes to argue the absence of an accident and intent. That does not mean that the inference is not 
also there that the defendant has the propensity to shoot his wife. Thus, the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion that telling a jury that a defendant has stolen in the past has no bearing on propensity is 
incorrect. As Wright and Graham put it in Federal Practice and Procedure: 
But the natural tendency of the human mind to generalize and our inability to tolerate 
uncertainty leads us to construct imaginary mechanisms to explain the conduct of 
others; such explanations may include an evil character or defective toilet training, or 
even such contingencies as having gotten up "on the wrong side of the bed." Some 
cases attempt to avoid the policy of the rule by engaging in word-play on the meaning 
of "character"; e.g., by claiming that the fact that a husband is jealous is not a 
character trait but simply a "particular emotional state." One could often say the same 
thing about greed, hatred, or lasciviousness and virtually do away with the rule. Such 
reckless generalizations may be tolerable in everyday affairs but courts are 
understandably reluctant to encourage their use in the jury room. 
Id. Telling the jury that the defendant is a common thief is tantamount to creating an irrebuttable 
presumption that the defendant commits a felony in Idaho every time he goes shopping. This is the 
very presumption the prosecutor argued to the jury in closing. Tr. p. 98, L. 3-14. This presumption 
stands in contravention ofldaho Supreme Court precedent on point. In State v. Burke, 11 Idaho 420, 
83 P. 228, 230 (1905), the Court held: 
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Whether or not the defendant is a man capable of committing such an offense, or has 
paid the penalty for the commission of an offense in another state, he is, nevertheless, 
entitled to a fair trial, and, if guilty, to be convicted upon evidence, and not upon 
insinuations and innuendo. The administration of even-handed justice demands it, 
and the law will sanction no other kind of a conviction. 
In State v. Haynes, 66 Idaho 291, 296 (1945), the Court held: 
The fact, that defendant was a persistent violator of the law and had served terms for 
previous offenses, can not [sic] be accepted as evidence of his guilt on the present 
charge. However, it serves to illustrate the dangers and sometimes the price and 
penalty of having a bad record and an unsavory reputation. Nevertheless, the law not 
only allows but invites a criminal to reform, and his previous misdeeds must not be 
taken as evidence against him when on trial under charge of a subsequent offense. 
Suspicion will not support a verdict of conviction. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeal's ruling in Brummett was manifestly wrong and should be 
overruled. In addition, as the case is now only five years old and appears to be incorrect in light of 
older authorities it is unlikely to cause great upheaval, and furthermore, to not correct its ruling on 
propensity evidence will cause continuing injustice. The District Court's ruling in this matter should 
be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Rawlings is now a felon because he shoplifted at Wal-Mart and a jury was told he had 
done so in the past. He threatened no one, did not have a weapon, and did not sneak inside the store. 
He simply wanted to give his daughter a good birthday. Idaho's conception of burglary is a 
dangerous anomaly that makes felons out of citizens for no rational reason, and in fact does so 
entirely based upon their thoughts. Whatever interests Idaho may have in making the random, 
talkative shoplifter a felon, they cannot overcome constitutional guarantees of fairness and liberty. 
Moreover, no one should be convicted on evidence of bad character. This Court should reverse the 
conviction and dismiss the matter, or remand for a new trial. 
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